a rogue operation, as it is sometimes accused of being, but rather of one that operated within a system of rules. Special laws, called an tri, allowed the arrest and prosecution of suspected Communists, but only within the legal system. Moreover, to avoid abuses such as phony accusations for personal reasons, or to rein in overzealous officials who might not be diligent enough in pursuing evidence before making arrests, An Tri required three separate sources of evidence to convict any individual targeted for neutralization.

If a suspected VCI was found guilty, he or she could be held in prison for two years, with renewable two-year sentences totaling up to six years. While this was probably fair on its surface, hardcore VCI were out in six years at most and then rejoined the guerrillas. The legal system was never really ironed out. The U.S. has the same problem today: accused terrorists held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and in other prisons fall within a shadowy middle ground that our policymakers and legal system have yet to deal with.

An assassination bureau? Between 1968 and 1972, Phoenix neutralized 81,740 VC, of whom 26,369 were killed. This was a large piece taken out of the VCI, and between 1969 and 1971, the program was quite successful in destroying the VCI in many important areas.[35] However, these statistics have been used to suggest that Phoenix was an assassination program. It was not. People were killed, yes, but statistics show that more than two-thirds of neutralized VC were captured, not killed. Indeed, only by capturing Viet Cong could Phoenix develop the intelligence needed to net additional Viet Cong. Abuses did occur, such as torture, which U.S. advisers could not always halt, but most advisers understood the adage that dead Viet Cong do not tell about live ones.

Phoenix was also accused of sometimes targeting civilians because the VCI did not wear military uniforms. But the VCI was an integral—indeed paramount—aspect of the insurgency and a legitimate target. We Americans should have done a better job of pointing this out to critics.

Contracting out the dirty work? Another charge was that Phoenix relied on other units to neutralize the VCI. Of the 26,000 VCI killed, 87 percent died during operations by conventional units. How effective was Phoenix if it accounted for only 13 percent of those killed in action? A later study found that a still-low 20 percent of the killed or captured neutralizations came from Phoenix assets, with most of the rest caught up in sweeps by regular units or by the RF/PF. Both claims are almost irrelevant: direct physical action was the conventional force, RF/PF part of a two-part job. The bottom line should have been 26,000 VCI permanently eliminated, never mind by whom.

Statistics themselves caused problems. During the first two years of Phoenix, each province was given a monthly quota of VC to neutralize, depending on the size of the infrastructure in the province. The quotas were often unrealistic and encouraged false reporting—or the capture of innocent people with whom South Vietnamese officials had a grudge. The quotas were lowered in 1969, and thereafter no VC could be counted in the total unless he or she had been convicted in court.[36]

Aiming low? Others critics attacked Phoenix for netting mostly middle- and low-level VC while senior leaders eluded capture. In fact, in 1968, before the VCI adapted to aggressive pursuit by Phoenix, about 13 percent of neutralizations were district and higher-level cadre. In 1970 and 1971, that figure dropped to about 3 percent.[37] The drop, however, masks two positive results: thanks to Phoenix, ranking VC had been forced to move to safer areas, thereby removing themselves from the "sea of the people" (which did not negate their ability to control village populations, but did make the job more difficult); and by attacking mid-level Viet Cong, Phoenix actually severed the link between the population and the party-level cadre calling the shots—a serious blow to the VCI.

Communist Testimony to Phoenix's Success

In the end, attacking the VCI was not as difficult as it might seem. the VCI was a secret organization, but to be effective in the villages, it had

to stay among the population, which made it vulnerable. Guerrillas could melt into the bush; in contrast, the VCI had to maintain contact with the people.

Although they were not completely successful, anti-infrastructure operations were a serious problem for the enemy, and he took drastic steps to limit the damage. By 1970, Communist plans repeatedly emphasized attacking the government's pacification program and specifically targeted Phoenix officials.[38] District and village officials became targets of VC assassination and terror as the Communists sought to reassert control over areas lost in 1969 and 1970. Ironically, the VC practiced the very thing for which critics excoriated Phoenix—the assassination of officials. The VC even imposed quotas. In 1970, for example, Communist officials near Danang in northern South Vietnam instructed VC assassins to "kill 1,400 persons" deemed to be government "tyrant[s]" and to "annihilate" anyone involved with the pacification program.[39]

Although the anti-infrastructure program did not crush the VCI, in combination with other pacification programs, it probably did hinder insurgent progress. In Vietnam, with its blend of guerrilla and main-force war, this was not enough to prevail, but it seems clear that without Phoenix, pacification would have fared far worse. Communist accounts after the war bear this out. In *Vietnam: A History*, Stanley Karnow quotes the North Vietnamese deputy commander in South Vietnam, General Tran Do, as saying that Phoenix was "extremely destructive."[40] Former Viet Cong Minister of Justice Truong Nhu Tang wrote in his memoirs that "Phoenix was dangerously effective" and that in Hau Nghia Province west of Saigon, "the Front Infrastructure was virtually eliminated."[41] Nguyen Co Thach, who became the Vietnamese foreign minister after the war, claimed that "[w]e had many weaknesses in the South because of Phoenix."[42]

Clearly, the political infrastructure is the basic building block of almost all insurgencies, and it must be a high-priority target for the counterinsurgent from the very beginning. In Vietnam, the allies faced an insurgency that emphasized political and military options in equal measure, but before the Tet Offensive weakened the Communists sufficiently to allow concentration on both main-force warfare and pacification, it was difficult to place sufficient emphasis on anti-infrastructure operations. Yet in just two years—between 1968 and 1970—the Phoenix program made significant progress against the VCI. What might have happened had the Americans and South Vietnamese begun it in 1960, when the Viet Cong were much weaker?

Assessing Pacification in Vietnam

Historian Richard A. Hunt characterizes the achievements of CORDS and the pacification program in Vietnam as "ambiguous."[43] Many high-ranking civilians and other officials who participated in the program, such as Komer, CIA director William Colby, and Westmoreland's military deputy, General Bruce Palmer, assert that CORDS made great gains between 1969 and 1972.[44] Some historians disagree with this assessment, but clearly the program made some progress in the years following the Tet Offensive. The security situation in many areas improved dramatically, releasing regular South Vietnamese troops to do battle with the North Vietnamese and main-force VC units. The program also spread Saigon's influence and increased the government's credibility with the South Vietnamese people.

Evidence suggests that one of the reasons Hanoi launched a major offensive in 1972 was to offset the progress that South Vietnam had made in pacification and in eliminating the VCI.[45] In the long run, however, those gains proved to be irrelevant. Although the South Vietnamese, with U.S. advisers and massive air support, successfully blunted North Vietnam's 1972 invasion, U.S. forces subsequently withdrew after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. When the fighting resumed shortly after the ceasefire in 1973, South Vietnamese forces acquitted themselves reasonably well, only to succumb to the final North Vietnamese offensive in 1975. In the end, Communist conventional forces, not the insurgents, defeated the South Vietnamese.

Lessons Learned

Despite the final outcome, there were lessons to be learned from Vietnam. The U.S. military applied some of these lessons to conflicts in the Philippines and El Salvador during the 1980s, and now that counterinsurgency is again in vogue, it would be wise for planners to reexamine pacification operations in Vietnam. The most important lessons to heed follow:

◆ Unity of effort is imperative; there must be a unified structure that combines military and pacification efforts. The pacification program in Vietnam did not make any headway until the different agencies involved were brought together under a single manager within the military C2 architecture. Once CORDS and Phoenix became part of the military chain of command, it was easier to get things done. The military tends to regard pacification tasks as something civilian agencies do; however, only the military has the budget, materiel, and manpower to get the job done.

◆ An insurgency thrives only as long as it can sustain a presence among the population. Make anti-infrastructure operations a first step in any COIN plan. Immediately establish an intelligence capability to identify targets, and use local forces to go after them.

◆ Do not keep the anti-infrastructure program a secret or it will develop a sinister reputation. Tell the people that the government intends to target the infrastructure as part of the security program. Locals must do most of the anti-infrastructure work, with the Americans staying in the background.

◆ Establish a clear legal framework for the pacification program, especially the anti-infrastructure effort. If this is done immediately and the program is run consistently, people will be more likely to accept it. Legality was a problem in Vietnam, and it is clearly a problem today.

◆ An insurgency will not be defeated on the battlefield. The fight is for the loyalty of the people, so establish a government-wide program to better the lives of people in the countryside. Improvement must go hand in hand with anti-infrastructure operations, or the population will likely regard government efforts as repressive.

◆ Above all, Americans must never forget that the host nation is responsible for maintaining security and establishing viable institutions that meet the people's needs, especially since the host nation will have to do the heavy lifting for itself after U.S. forces leave.

These lessons might seem obvious, and it is true that with hindsight they might be easily identified; however, in practice, they are hard to execute. This should not, however, stop us from trying to apply the lessons learned in Southeast Asia to Iraq and Afghanistan. CORDS was one of the Vietnam War's success stories, and its well-conceived, well-executed programs and successful synthesis of civilian and military efforts offer a useful template for current and future COIN operations.

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18. Memorandum from Lyndon B. Johnson to Komer, Subject: Second Komer Trip to Vietnam, 23-29 June 1966, 1 July 1966, 6, Historians files, CMH, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.
19. Johnson to Komer, National Security Action Memorandum 362, Responsibility for U.S. Role in Pacification (Revolutionary Development), on-line at <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam362.asp>, accessed 27 March 2006.
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21. Ibid., 72.
22. Ibid., 76.
23. Richard A. Hunt, *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 93.
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30. Dale Andrade, *Ashes to Ashes: The Phoenix Program and the Vietnam War* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), Appen. A-2, "Resource Allocations."
31. Ibid., 87-91.
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

Part VII
Global War on Terrorism: Overview and Strategy

Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency

by David W. Barno

Parameters, Summer 2006

> "War is . . . an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will."
>
> —Carl von Clausewitz [1]

The strategic nature of war has changed, and our military and government are striving to adapt to fight and win in this new environment. Today we are engaged in a global counterinsurgency, an unprecedented challenge which requires a level of original strategic thought and depth of understanding perhaps comparable only to that of the Cold War. Our ongoing political-military actions to achieve success in Iraq and Afghanistan are simply subordinate efforts of this larger, complex world war.

Our enemies today clearly understand the value of asymmetrical approaches when dealing with the overwhelming conventional combat power of the United States military. Unfortunately, our unmatched conventional capability has slowed the U.S. response to the changing, asymmetrical nature of modern war.[2] We as a military are at risk of failing to understand the nature of the war we are fighting—a war which has been characterized as "a war of intelligence and a war of perceptions."[3] We must confront this dilemma and take our thinking to a new strategic level in this era to understand the tools and strategic approaches required to create victory in this very different 21st-century environment.

Fourth Generation Warfare: Global Insurgency

Retired Marine Colonel T. X. Hammes, in his recent book *The Sling and the Stone*, outlines an

innovative construct to better understand the evolution of warfare.[4] The book's striking cover photo epitomizes the paradox in today's warfare of "weak against strong": it shows a young Palestinian boy, arm upraised, about to hurl a rock at a huge, U.S.-made Israeli M60 tank. The shades of meaning are rich. In his insightful work, Hammes describes four evolutions of warfare, which he characterizes as First through Fourth Generation War. This theory is helpful as we examine the context of war today and assess the effectiveness of today's military to engage in—and win—these wars. Hammes's description provides us an alternative model to compare with our current "network-centric" model of war, which often seems primarily designed for nation-states engaged in force-on-force battles.[5] First Generation Warfare in this alternative construct dates from the invention of gunpowder, which produced the first military formations and tactics cued to firearms.

First Generation Warfare was an offensively oriented type of war, where light weaponry, limited-size armies, and horse and foot mobility provided very limited strategic mobility—armies walked everywhere—but some modest tactical mobility, with small armies unencumbered by extensive heavy weaponry. This era culminated in the Napoleonic wars of the early 1800s, and warfare began to change dramatically by the middle of the 19th century. By the time of the U.S. Civil War, the advent of advanced transportation and communications systems, combined with heavier mobile firepower, signified the emergence of a new model—Second Generation Warfare.

Second Generation Warfare revolved around rapidly growing strategic speed of communication and transport—telegraphs and railways—in concert with massed armies armed with ever-deadlier small arms and artillery. This phase encompassed the Franco-Prussian War of the 1870s, the turn-of-the-century Boer War and Russo-Japanese conflicts, and ultimately the huge, million-man armies of World War I. The latter were massive formations linked to devastating direct and indirect firepower, leading inexorably to the strategic and tactical stalemate of trench warfare. Second Generation Warfare was characterized by large armies with strategic (but limited tactical) mobility, unprecedented weaponry, and explosive "throw weight," resultant heavy casualties, and gradual diminishment of maneuver, all of which pointed toward the defense achieving gradual dominance over the offense.

In response to this battlefield paralysis, Third Generation Warfare emerged in the 1920s and 30s and produced "blitzkrieg" and the age of maneuver warfare, with the offense once again gaining supremacy. This era of mounted mechanized maneuver continued from World War II through the Arab-Israeli wars of the 1950s and 60s, included Desert Storm in 1991 (perhaps its zenith), and culminated with the race to Baghdad in March 2003. (Excursions into counterinsurgency conflicts in places like French Indochina, Algeria, Malaya, Vietnam, and the two Intifadas in Israel not only failed to significantly affect mainstream military thinking, but they often turned out rather badly for Western armies.) Today, after 40 years of Cold War experience and billions of dollars spent on weapon system investments, the United States and most Western militaries remain optimized for Third Generation Warfare, reflecting nearly 50 years of tactical, operational, and strategic thought and resource commitments originally designed to contain and deter the Soviet threat, and if necessary to defeat a Warsaw Pact armored invasion of Western Europe.[6]

Hammes contends that we have now entered into the age of Fourth Generation Warfare, which he brands "netwar." (The term is a bit confusing given the better-known "network-centric operations" terminology.[7]) Fourth Generation Warfare "uses all available networks—political, economic, social, and military—to convince the enemy's political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit. *It is an evolved form of insurgency.*"[8] Fourth Generation Warfare argues that the enemy's target becomes the political establishment and the policymakers of his adversary, not the adversary's armed forces or tactical formations. The enemy achieves victory by putting intense, unremitting pressure on adversary decision makers, causing them to eventually capitu-



Figure 1. The U.S. military construct for the levels of war.

late, independent of military success or failure on the battlefield. Fourth Generation Warfare deserves to be studied closely by the military, primarily because it outlines a compellingly logical way to look at asymmetrical warfare, a challenging topic for Western militaries.

Competing Paradigms of War

Another way to view the challenge we face with an asymmetrically oriented enemy is to examine our current warfighting construct: the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war, often represented as a triangle, as shown in Figure 1. At the base is the tactical level, where engagements and battles are fought, entailing direct combat actions ranging from squad to brigade echelon. The tactical level is the stage at which the vast preponderance of our troops and equipment are committed and engaged daily. The second level, the center of the triangle, is the operational level. At this echelon, campaigns are developed which give shape to the battles and connect them in ways that ultimately lead to campaign, and eventually strategic, success. Next, most often displayed at the top of the triangle, is the strategic level, where policymakers lay out the broad political-military goals and end-states which the operational campaigns are designed to serve.[9]

This model represents an accepted view of modern warfare which has become largely institutionalized as the warfighting paradigm within the U.S. military since the Vietnam War. In fact, the addition of the operational level of war was perhaps the most significant change in U.S. military doctrine to emerge as the military's direct response to the largely unexamined lessons of Vietnam.[10] Of note is a distinct "political" level, often omitted from this paradigm, which rightfully belongs at the apex. This top-most position reflects recognition of the "grand strategic" level but also acknowledges the inherent purpose that lies beyond the purely military character of war and its intended results—results that are often if not always political in nature.[11] Students of war and military professionals overlook the political level in our paradigm of warfare at great risk.

Arguably, Figure 1 also represents the investment balance of organizational effort within the

U.S. military as it prepares for and thinks about war. Doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, personnel, and facilities are weighted heavily toward the tactical level—the large base of the triangle—with proportionally much less effort assigned to the operational and strategic levels. A cursory look at defense spending will identify that by far the greatest amounts of both procurement and future research and development are allocated for tactical-level requirements.[12] Tanks, helicopters, fighter planes, individual body armor, assault amphibians, cruise missiles, munitions of all sorts, unmanned aerial vehicles, "littoral combat ships"—all provide the combat power to fight and win battles at the tactical level. Unfortunately, winning more tactical-level battles in an era of Fourth Generation Warfare does not lead inevitably to winning the war. In point of fact, with more and more responsibility for the operational and strategic levels of war shifting to joint organizations—a by-product of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act—the military services have become more tactical in their focus, charged to "organize, train, and equip" rather than to "fight and win." Service jargon is replete with references to "warfighting" but rarely speaks of the vastly more important "war-winning." The decisive strategic responsibility of "winning our wars" has been largely shifted away from the services toward others in the "joint world" with far shallower institutional, intellectual, and resource foundations. This is a little-recognized development with complex implications when fighting a global "long war."

The Insurgent Paradigm

Ironically, our enemies in this "long war" may have developed their own version of our paradigm of warfare. Assessing the enemy's efforts over the past five years, one could argue that they are employing the same construct and levels of war, but with the orientation reversed—apex low, base high, as shown in Figure 2, on the following page. Al-Qaeda and their associated elements—the "global insurgents"—have clearly chosen to place their foremost effort at the top: the political and strategic level. They appear to understand and seem to be employing Hammes's concept of Fourth Generation Warfare. Their political strategic targets are the decisionmakers and influencing elites in the United States and in the global community. Their operational level works to string together minor tactical engagements (often carefully chosen) via global media coverage to create international strategic and political effects. Their lowest dollar investment, unlike ours, is at the tactical level, where improvised explosive devices and suicide bombers carry their strategic freight with great effect. Their command and control system is the Internet, the laptop, the courier, and the cell phone, drawing on technologies which were invented and paid for by their adversaries in the developed world. Their intelligence system does not rely on satellites or unmanned aerial vehicles, but commonly upon human sources inside our bases and near our operational units, employing a family, tribal, or ethnic-based network that is impenetrable to Westerners. Their biggest operational weapon is the global information grid, particularly the international media. Indeed, the media are a weapon system of "mass effect" for the terrorist to achieve his strategic and political "grand strategy" objectives, and he relishes the fact that we rightly cherish and protect both our freedom of speech and an adversarial media as central tenets of one of our most important freedoms, because it aids him immensely in pursuing his strategic goals.

An interesting example of the terrorists' sophistication in blending these levels occurred in March 2005 in Afghanistan. One evening in the area of the Afghan-Pakistan border near Khowst, a major enemy attack began to develop. Three border checkpoints controlled by Afghan forces came under mortar and ground attack, and at the same time, two U.S. sites which hosted reinforcing artillery and attack helicopters also were hit with rockets. One Afghan border post was pressed hard by more than 100 enemy fighters. Despite the unprecedented nature of this nighttime, five-point coordinated attack, Afghan forces fought back well, and in concert with attack helicopters and timely artillery support, they repulsed the border-post attacks and inflicted many enemy casualties. This attack occurred with no apparent advance warning during a tra-



Figure 2. The insurgent construct for the levels of war.

ditionally quiet winter period in a rugged mountainous region of the country. What made it particularly notable was that it coincided precisely with Afghan President Hamid Karzai's first official state visit to meet with his Pakistani counterpart, President Pervez Musharraf, in Islamabad—and that early in the morning following the attack, an Al Jazeera news crew suddenly drove up to the point of the main attack in this very remote part of the border to capture what they obviously expected to be a very different outcome on film. Clearly, this enemy understands the political and strategic level of a global insurgency.

General John P. Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, has described the war against al-Qaeda and their associated movements as "a war of intelligence and a war of perceptions."[13] Both aspects present enormous challenges for the United States and our Coalition friends and allies. Our intelligence systems and capabilities are among the most sophisticated and expensive in the world, but their ability to give us credible insight into the minds and planning of our adversaries remains problematic. The war of perceptions—winning a battle of ideas, influencing other cultures, countering the virulent message of hate and intolerance promoted by our enemies—is a bitter conflict fought out every day in an environment of 24/7 news coverage and a continuous global news cycle. Both of these crucial battlegrounds remain arenas where the West and the United States face serious challenges and are often swimming against the tide in a complex foreign culture.

Intelligence: The "80/20 Rule" and "Boiling Frogs"

Clausewitz observed that "many intelligence reports in war are contradictory, even more are false, and most are uncertain."[14] What military intelligence officer today would publicly stand up and endorse Clausewitz's admonition during a senior-level intelligence briefing? Yet the assertion that intelligence reports tend to be contradictory, false, and uncertain represents intelli-

gence realities. To the contrary, the 40-year Cold War gave us powerful capabilities and unprecedented levels of confidence in our modern intelligence systems. At the height of this half-century conflict, we had devised technological solutions to our intelligence challenges which surpassed any capabilities previously known in the history of conflict. From the modest successes of the U2 surveillance aircraft program (brought into high profile after the 1962 shoot down of Francis Gary Powers over the Soviet Union), the United States designed, built, and deployed a comprehensive satellite surveillance program which ultimately provided unprecedented overhead access to historically denied territories around the world. Listening posts dotted the periphery of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). A human spy network behind the Iron Curtain provided uniquely sensitive information. After four decades of primary focus on a fixed enemy, our intelligence capabilities became singularly optimized to peer at ICBM fields, observe submarine fleet anchorages, scan bomber-packed airfields, monitor Warsaw Pact tank divisions, and—with a network of spies—look deep inside the Soviet governmental and military bureaucracies.

Our human intelligence penetration of the USSR was significant and priceless, tragically revealed by the betrayals of numerous American agents by Soviet moles Aldrich Ames inside the CIA and Robert Hanssen inside the FBI.[15] The ideological power of our Western influence as functioning and prosperous democracies of free people gave us leverage in recruiting Soviet citizens to spy on their own country, a "Free World" ideological advantage noticeably absent in penetrating terrorist networks today. Billions of dollars were devoted to these holistic intelligence efforts, and the results were clearly impressive. One could unscientifically estimate that a U.S. president sitting down to his daily intelligence briefing in the 1960s, 1970s, or well into the 1980s could have perhaps an 80-percent confidence level in the veracity and completeness of the intelligence picture painted on at least the Soviet Union, our most dangerous opponent. The existence of an aggressive foreign power with the largest nuclear arsenal in the world aimed at the United States was a powerful incentive for massive spending on intelligence and unsparing efforts to discern not only the capabilities, but the intentions, of this prime adversary.

As the Soviet Union began to disintegrate in the late 1980s, however, our intelligence system remained largely unchanged. Presidents continued to get their daily worldwide intelligence briefings, but gradually the levels of confidence and certainty in the picture began to slip from the peak Cold War performance levels of an optimized system. It was a slip unnoticed by the participants, and perhaps by the briefers as well. Institutional momentum and past successes kept investments steady or growing in high-technology systems, and one can surmise that satellites and other overhead collectors continued to receive robust resourcing.

But in comparison to the perhaps 80 percent confidence level in the accuracy of the products against the Soviets, our level of confidence in today's intelligence products against an obscure worldwide enemy network ought to perhaps be more like 20 percent. In an environment of global insurgency, fighting a loosely organized worldwide terrorist network enabled by modern technology, a movement based upon twisted religious interpretations and playing upon feelings of economic and political inadequacy in a world racing toward globalization in all aspects of life, our technology-dependent intelligence system is operating at a huge disadvantage. Our enemy has no ICBM fields, no submarine pens, no tank divisions, and no standing governmental or military bureaucracy to penetrate. Aside from cars, trucks, and motorcycles, he has no "platforms," yet most of our costly intelligence tools tend to be optimized to find and report on just that. Acquiring high-value human intelligence continues to be extremely difficult, and penetrating a closed culture with intense internal loyalties and a strong bias toward family and tribal lines is immensely tough.

Most important, though, our military leaders and commanders today have to recalibrate their thought processes to better understand what they are seeing and what they are not. In my experience, no intelligence officer worth his or her salt will give a senior leader an intelligence

briefing without crisp certainties in the conclusions. In fact, in our military we expect and demand the intelligence officer, the "G2," to take a defined stance, to tell us definitively what the enemy is going to do. Again, in the Cold War era, the West had multiple overlapping and redundant means of detecting, assessing, and confirming key intelligence findings. In today's environment, operating against a shadowy terrorist network distributed globally in loosely aligned autonomous cells, our ability to have any significant degree of confidence in our intelligence certainty should be very much in question and viewed with extreme skepticism. In my estimation, we simply do not know what, or how much, we do not know. We're back to the world of Clausewitz. What was an 80-percent certainty during the Cold War is now 20 percent—this is "the 80/20 Rule" of modern intelligence.

The "Boiling Frog" theory characterizes another intelligence challenge that bedevils our professionals: the tyranny of short time horizons. When fighting an enemy who views time in decades or generations, Americans—perhaps particularly those fighting overseas on one-year tours of duty—are at a great disadvantage. We live in a "microwave society" of instant results, and our trend analysis in counterinsurgency operations reflects this. During 2003-2005 in Afghanistan, our "long-term" time comparisons were inevitably to events just one year prior. We essentially had no data from 2001 or 2002 for a variety of reasons—early-stage operations, inadequate records keeping, staff turnover—so our longitudinal assessment of the counterinsurgency was at best a one- to two-year comparative look.

My U.S. military intelligence team in Afghanistan dreaded the inevitable question: "Are we the boiling frog?" Legend has it that a frog placed in a shallow pot of water heating on a stove will remain happily in the pot of water as the temperature continues to climb, and will not jump out even as the water slowly reaches the boiling point and kills the frog. The change of one degree of temperature at a time is so gradual that the frog doesn't realize he is being boiled until it is too late. Our limited Western time horizons often precluded any serious look at a ten-year (much less a 25-year) timeline to discern the long-term effect of our policies, or a long-term comprehension of what the enemy might be attempting, ever so slowly. This is a significant risk to any Western intelligence system, perhaps most so with Americans and our perceived "need for speed." In a culture of generational conflicts, centuries-old tribal loyalties, and infinite societal and family memories, we are at a significant disadvantage.

The War of Perceptions: Information Operations

Clausewitz also wrote that war "is a trial of moral and physical forces through the medium of the latter. Naturally, moral strength must not be excluded, for psychological forces exert a decisive influence on the elements involved in war."[16] The counterinsurgency campaign waged in Afghanistan from late 2003 until mid-2005 was underpinned by information operations. Un-fortunately, in a war of ideas, our ability to influence ideas and shape perceptions as Westerners briefly transplanted into this remote, isolated region of the world with an infinitely different culture was an enormous challenge. As Westerners and Americans, we tended to be linear and impassive thinkers focused on quick solutions—operating in a foreign world of nuance, indirection, and close personal relations tied to trust, with extended time horizons. The Taliban often reminded villagers: "The Americans may have all the wristwatches, but we have all the time."

Our U.S. information operations doctrine was designed for a different era and in many ways simply did not fit the war we were fighting. It doctrinally bundled together "apples, oranges, pianos, Volkswagens, and skyscrapers" into one package—psychological operations, operational security, military deception, offensive and defensive computer network operations, and electronic warfare.[17] This official collection of disparate conceptual entities did little to assist us in our struggle to understand and operate in a war that was ultimately about winning hearts and minds, and about keeping our side resolutely in the fight.

The enemy instinctively seemed to understand how to exploit the media (international and local), tribal customs and beliefs, rumors and cultural predispositions toward mystery and conspiracy, and a host of other subtle but effective communications. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban targeted their messages to influence both decision makers and ordinary people—in Afghanistan, in Pakistan, in the Gulf region, in Europe, in the United States, and across a global audience. A blatant lie or obviously false claim by the Taliban would resonate throughout the cultural system of Afghanistan down to every valley and village, and it would be next to impossible to subsequently counter such falsehoods with facts. In a tribal society, rumors count, emotions carry huge weight, the extreme seems plausible, and "facts" reported outside the trusted confines of family, village, and tribe are subject to great skepticism. This "local" phenomenon carried weight throughout the region and is arguably the norm across much of the Islamic world.

The deadly outbursts in Afghanistan following the ultimately false reports of American desecration of the Koran at Guantanamo demonstrated the emotional power of "breaking cultural news." Widespread rioting and protests across the Muslim world after the publication in Europe of cartoons depicting the prophet Muhammad reflect the same powerful and emotional cultural religious phenomenon. Messages from "the West" were often viewed with inherent suspicion, simply because they were from outsiders. We worked hard to overcome these difficulties, mostly through exercising the most effective information operations technique—having a good story to tell, and always telling the truth.

The public affairs component of this strategy deserves some discussion. In late 2004, General Richard Myers, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, published a directive message explicitly separating public affairs from information operations in the U.S. military, and he articulated some very powerful reasons why this separation should be so.[18] U.S. public affairs officers around the world cheered, but many commanders cringed. The work of winning a "war of ideas" was not made any easier for deployed commanders, but Myers's point was a valid one—the recognition that we waged 21st-century warfare in the "spin zone" of both international media and domestic politics could not permit or excuse an environment where facts might be changed or reporters manipulated to deliberately create false perceptions.

The line remains a fine one for commanders. In an environment where the enemy leverages global media to get out a recurrent message of hopelessness and despair, of carnage and fear, how do military leaders counter the overwhelming impression that all the victories are on the enemy's side? How do we overcome the perception that every bombing or ambush resulting in American casualties signifies that we are "losing"? As some pundits have noted, if Americans at home had been able to watch the 1944 D-Day invasion of Normandy in real time on CNN from the first wave at Omaha Beach, there would have been little hope in the public mind that the Third Reich would surrender just 11 months later! Some Americans might have clamored for a negotiated settlement. But no one in the global audience in 1944 viewed Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan as the "moral equivalents" of the Allies, nor did any news organization in the West report on World War II as though it was a neutral observer at a sporting event. The Allies against the Axis was not a game show where the outcomes were unimportant to the average citizen, and the news media did not report on it as though they were neutral about the results.

It's increasingly apparent that this "values-neutral" approach and largely detached moral position prevail across much of the international (and U.S.) media today. Are the bloody terrorists who decapitate innocent hostages on camera morally equivalent to the democratically elected governments of the United States and Great Britain? Are they as deserving of empathy and respect as the freely elected leaders in Afghanistan and Iraq? Some media outlets—and not insignificant numbers of citizens in the Muslim world—would contend it is so. We do not have to agree with these chilling perceptions to register them and to reflect seriously on what measures are required to reverse them. The painful implications of this set of arguably common Islamic perceptions should give us pause. Is

nothing commonly reprehensible to all peoples? All these complexities of perception and culture are alive in a 24/7 news-cycle world of instant communications, and they utterly change the dynamics of fighting and winning a war against a global insurgency today.

Finally, a growing phenomenon subtly capitalized on by our terrorist enemies is the instant politicization of distant battlefield events (especially reverses) in the American political process here at home. There are surely disturbing echoes of the bitter political contentiousness of Vietnam in today's party-centric debates over the nature and strategy of this war, but that debate also reflects a healthy symptom of politics in a free society. That said, it is unfortunate that in an era of continuous electoral politics, somehow successful activities in this war—from battles won to elections held to civil affairs projects completed—seem to be scored as "wins" for the present administration, while tactical setbacks, bombings, heavy casualties, or local political reverses are construed as "losses," and seem to somehow be twisted to add to the political capital of the opposition party. Although largely unintentional, this perverse situation is flat-out wrong, and it does a disservice to our fighting men and women in harm's way. Wars should always supercede "politics as usual," especially in an age of Fourth Generation Warfare with the enemy deliberately targeting decision makers on the home front as part of its premeditated strategy. There was a time in American politics, especially in time of war, when politics stopped at the water's edge and our friends and enemies alike saw a unified, bipartisan approach to foreign policy from American elected leaders. In the current "long war," fought out 24/7 under the bright lights of continuous talk shows, and where resolve, staying power, and American and allied unity are the very principles that the enemy is desperately trying to undermine, that once respected bipartisan principle in our foreign policy needs to be recaptured.

Conclusion: Our Strategic Challenge

Strategy in a global counterinsurgency requires a new level of thinking. A world of irregular threats and asymmetrical warfare demands that we broaden our thinking beyond the norms of traditional military action once sufficient to win our wars. The focus of this global insurgency of violent Islamist extremism exploits the concepts of Fourth Generation Warfare with a calculated assault on perceptions at home, on our decision makers, and on the public. In a war of intelligence and a war of perceptions, we grapple to understand how to best devise a war-winning strategy given the predominantly conventional warfighting tools in our military toolbox—and our vulnerabilities outside the military sphere. Realities are that an unbroken series of tactical military victories in today's war, the primary focus of our Army and Marine Corps, will not assure strategic success, yet our conventional military organizations and service cultures seem increasingly tactical. An effective strategy does not result from the aggregate of an unlimited number of tactical data points. Commanders assert, "We simply cannot be defeated militarily in this war." That may be true, but this statement masks the fact that we can potentially be defeated by other than purely military means.

How big is our concept of war? With our enemies committed to an unlimited war of unlimited means—al-Qaeda will clearly use a nuclear weapon against the United States if it gains the means—how can we continue to regard this fight as a limited war and keep our focus chiefly on accumulating an unbroken series of battlefield tactical successes which we somehow think will collectively deliver victory? How do we justify our military services' institutional fixation with accruing more and more tactical capability in the face of an enemy which places no value on tactical engagements except to achieve his strategic and political objectives? Where do we best invest our future defense dollars to gain leverage over this new "global insurgent," an enemy with no tanks, no air force, no navy, and no satellites? What type of provocation will it take for Americans to fully commit to a "long war" against an enemy who is engaged in a war without limits against us? And what does an all-out "long war" mean for America within the ethical and moral values of our nation in the 21st century?

Many of these questions are beyond the scope

of this article, but they point to the complex dimensions of understanding the nature of the war we fight today—a Fourth Generation War—and the means required for us *to win*. As a military charged with fighting this new type of war, a global insurgency, we must better grasp ownership of the fight. In some sense, as society's trustee in the conduct of our nation's wars, we must accept the full range of war, tactical to strategic level. After all, winning wars—and preventing them—are the only reasons our military exists. If we as a nation or a member of a coalition are ultimately defeated by our enemies, the reasons for that defeat—whether military, political, or economic—will be far less important than the result. We must more fully leverage all the intellectual as well as physical capabilities inside our military to assure such a defeat remains unthinkable. We need to contribute more directly toward a comprehensive strategy leading to long-term victory. Battlefield victories result from good tactics, training, and leadership; strategic victories result from thinking through the right strategy and executing it aggressively. Our military should be the repository of the deepest reservoirs of strategic thinking on winning our wars—of any type. But for our military to deny that an asymmetric defeat at the strategic level is even possible in this unconventional war is the equivalent of burying our heads in the sand and increases our risk.

While protecting against tactical or operational-level defeat on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, our military needs to also guard against the dangers of strategic-level defeat. This is not just "someone else's problem." We need to understand the nature of the war we are fighting, and we need to avoid the temptation to define our war as the *tactical* battle we would like to fight rather than the *strategic* fight we are in with a thinking enemy who strikes daily at our national political will here at home.

The military's role in addressing this asymmetrical "war of wills" is hypersensitive. This predicament is a very real problem inherent in 21st century warfare, and the military needs to understand and support the civilian leadership in defending this flank. Bipartisan recognition and defense of this Achilles' heel is also necessary to deprive our enemies of its effect. America's military contribution needs to evolve toward designing a war-winning series of campaigns and, perhaps even more important, helping our civilian leadership to craft the broad political-military grand strategy necessary to succeed against a dangerous and resourceful enemy in this "long war." We as a military must fully understand, accept, and take ownership of "war-winning" as well as "war-fighting" if we are to fulfill our role in defending the society we are pledged to serve. If this conflict is truly a "long war" against violent global extremism, against an ideology of hate and destruction as dangerous as fascism in the 1930s and communism in the 1950s, then we as a military have to take on the institutional and intellectual challenges to fight and to win this very different war against a determined and dangerous enemy.

Notes

1. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976), 75.
2. Asymmetrical warfare in this context is best described as the means by which a conventionally weak adversary can fight and win against the conventionally strong opposite number. The term "insurgency" in this article describes irregular warfare characterized by unconventional elements battling against a prevailing or established order.
3. General John P. Abizaid, personal conversation with the author, 2004.
4. Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, Minn.: Zenith Press, 2004). This is perhaps the most original book on present-day warfare in an era of weaker powers battling conventionally strong adversaries via asymmetrical approaches. Hammes casts serious doubt on the notions of technology, information, and speed of decision making as effective attributes in dealing with an insurgent enemy.
5. Arthur K. Cebrowski and John J. Gartska, "Network Centric Warfare: Its Origins and Futures," *Proceedings,* January 1998.
6. Hammes, 16-31.
7. Cebrowski and Gartska. "Network-centric operations"—much different from Fourth Generation netwar—describes a theory of war which argues in effect that rapid war-winning results can be rendered by

speed of decisions and actions produced by centralized networks of communications, intelligence, and command and control.

8. Hammes, 2. Italics added.

9. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington: GPO, 2005). The tactical level of war is defined as, "The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces." The operational level is, "The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas." The strategic level is, "The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish those objectives."

10. Harry R. Summers, On Strategy: *A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1981).

11. The essence of grand strategy is described by Colonel John Boyd (USAF Ret.) as to "shape pursuit of the national goal so that we not only amplify our spirit and strength (while undermining and isolating our adversaries) but also influence the uncommitted or potential adversaries so that they are drawn toward our philosophy and are empathetic toward our success." Boyd, "Patterns of Conflict," briefing, December 1986, slide 140, http://www.d-n-i.net/boyd/pdf/poc.pdf.

12. U.S. Congress, *Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act*, H. R. 1815 (Washington: GPO, 2005). Available at U.S. House Armed Services Committee website, http://www.house.gov/hasc/.

13. Abizaid conversation.

14. Clausewitz, 117.

15. Chitra Ragavan, "Kings of Cold War Treachery: Robert Hanssen and Aldrich Ames," *U.S. News & World Report*, 27 January 2003.

16. Clausewitz, 127. Emphasis added.

17. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, Joint Pub 3-13 (Washington: GPO, 1998), 18.

18. General Richard B. Myers, "Myers Letter to Commanders on Public Affairs and Information Operations," 27 September 2004, quoted by Mark Mazzetti, "U.S. Use of Media in War Sparks Debate," *Los Angeles Times*, 1 December 2004: "Although both [public affairs] and [military information operations] conduct planning, message development, and media analysis, the efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and intent, and must remain separate."

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Countering Evolved Insurgent Networks

by Thomas X. Hammes

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The first step in meeting the challenge facing us in Iraq today or in similar war zones tomorrow is to understand that insurgency and counterinsurgency are very different tasks. The use of Special Forces against insurgents in Vietnam to "out-guerrilla the guerrillas" provided exactly the wrong solution to the problem. It assumed that the insurgent and the counterinsurgent can use the same approach to achieve their quite different goals.

To define insurgency, I use Bard O'Neill from *Insurgency and Terrorism.* He states: "Insurgency may be defined as a struggle between a nonruling group and the ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses *political resources* (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and *violence* to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics."[1]

Counterinsurgency, as defined by Ian Beckett, "is far from being a purely military problem . . . coordination of both the civil and military effort must occur at all levels and embrace the provision of intelligence. . . ."[2]

On the surface, these definitions suggest that insurgency and counterinsurgency are similar because each requires political and military action. However, when one thinks it through, the challenge is very different for the government. The government must accomplish something. It must govern effectively. In contrast, the insurgent only has to propose an idea for a better future while ensuring the government cannot govern effectively.

In Iraq, the resistance does not even project a better future. It simply has the nihilistic goal of ensuring the government cannot function. This negative goal is much easier to achieve than governing. For instance, it is easier and more direct to use military power than to apply political, economic, and social techniques. The insurgent can use violence to delegitimize a government (because that government cannot fulfill the basic social contract to protect the people). However, simple application of violence by the government cannot restore that legitimacy. David Galula, in his classic *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, expresses the difference between insurgency and counterinsurgency very clearly: "Revo-lutionary warfare . . . represents an exceptional case not only because as we suspect, it has its special rules, different from those of the conventional war, but also because most of the rules applicable to one side do not work for the other. In a fight between a fly and a lion, the fly cannot deliver a knockout blow and the lion cannot fly. It is the same war for both camps in terms of space and time, yet there are two distinct warfares [sic]—the revolutionary's, and shall we say, the counterrevolutionary's."

Enduring Traits of Insurgency

Mao Zedong wrote his famous *On Guerrilla War* [Yu Chi Chan] in 1937. Despite the passage of time, many of his basic observations about insurgency remain valid. First and foremost, insurgency is a political, not a military, struggle. It is not amenable to a purely military solution without resorting to a level of brutality unacceptable to the Western world. Even the particularly brutal violence Russia has inflicted upon Chechnya—killing almost 25 percent of the total population and destroying its cities—has not resulted in victory.

The second factor has to do with the political will of the counterinsurgent's own population. If that population turns sour when faced with the long time frame and mounting costs of counterinsurgency, the insurgent will win. This has been particularly true whenever the United States has become involved in counterinsurgency operations. Insurgents have learned over the last 30 years that they do not have to defeat the United States militarily to drive us out of an insurgency; they only have to destroy our political will. Today's insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq understand this and have made the political will

of the U.S. population a primary target of their efforts.

A third unchanging aspect of insurgency involves duration. Insurgencies are measured in decades, not months or years. The Chinese Communists fought for 27 years. The Vietnamese fought the U.S. for 30 years. The Palestinians have been resisting Israel since at least 1968. Even when the counterinsurgent has won, it has taken a long time. The Malaya emergency and the El Salvadoran insurgency each lasted 12 years.

Finally, despite America's love of high technology, technology does not provide a major advantage in counterinsurgency. In fact, in the past, the side with the simplest technology often won. What has been decisive in most counterinsurgencies were the human attributes of leadership, cultural understanding, and political judgment.

In short, the key factors of insurgency that have not changed are its political nature, its protracted timelines, and its intensely human (versus technological) nature.

Emerging Traits of Insurgency

While these hallmarks of insurgency have remained constant, the nature of insurgency has evolved in other areas. Like all forms of war, insurgency changes in consonance with the political, economic, social, and technical conditions of the society it springs from. Insurgencies are no longer the special province of single-party organizations like Mao's and Ho Chi Minh's. Today, insurgent organizations are comprised of loose coalitions of the willing, human networks that range from local to global. This reflects the social organizations of the societies they come from and the reality that today's most successful organizations are networks rather than hierarchies.

In addition to being composed of coalitions, insurgencies also operate across the spectrum from local to transnational organizations. Because these networks span the globe, external actors such as the Arabs who fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Afghans who fought in Bosnia, and the European Muslims who are showing up in Iraq, are now a regular part of insurgencies.

In a coalition insurgency, the goals of the different elements may vary, too. In Afghanistan today, some of the insurgents simply wish to rule their own valleys; others seek to rule a nation. Al-Qaeda is fighting for a transnational caliphate. In Iraq, many of the Sunni insurgents seek a secular government dominated by Sunnis. Other Sunnis—the Salafists—want a strict Islamic society ruled by Sharia. Among the Shi'a, Muqtada al-Sadr operated as an insurgent, then shifted to the political arena (while maintaining a powerful militia and a geographic base in the slums of Sadr City). Although temporarily out of the insurgent business, his forces remain a factor in any armed conflict. Other Shi'a militias are also prepared to enter the military equation if their current political efforts do not achieve their goals. Finally, criminal elements in both Afghanistan and Iraq participate in the unrest primarily for profit.

At times, even their hatred of the outsider is not strong enough to keep these various coalition groups from fighting among themselves. Such factionalism was a continuing problem for anti-Soviet insurgents in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and savvy Soviet commanders exploited it at times. We see major signs of the same symptom in Iraq today.

This complex mixture of players and motives is now the pattern for insurgencies. If insurgents succeed in driving the Coalition out of Afghanistan and Iraq, their own highly diverse coalitions of the willing will not be able to form a government; their mutually incompatible beliefs will lead to continued fighting until one faction dominates. This is what happened in Afghanistan when the insurgents drove the Soviets out. Similar disunity appeared in Chechnya after the Soviets withdrew in 1996, and infighting only ceased when the Russians returned to install their own government. Early signs of a similar power struggle are present in the newly evacuated Gaza Strip.

The fact that recent insurgencies have been coalitions is a critical component in understanding them. For too long, American leaders stated that the insurgency in Iraq could not be genuine because it had no unifying cause or leader; therefore, it could not be a threat. The insurgents in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Palestine have never

New Insurgency Traits

- Emergence of networked coalitions of the willing
- Evolution into transdimensional organizations
- Ability to fund themselves
- Wide variety of motivations behind different coalitions elements

had a unified leadership or belief other than that the outside power had to go. Yet these insurgents have driven out the Soviet Union and continue to contest the United States, Russia, and Israel. The lack of unity in current insurgencies only makes them more difficult to defeat. It is a characteristic that we have to accept and understand.

Showing the adaptability characteristic of successful organizations, many insurgencies are now transdimensional as well as transnational. As Western efforts have reduced the number of insurgent safe havens, insurgents have aggressively moved into cyberspace. There, the high capacity of broadband has greatly increased the Internet's utility for insurgents. Expanding from simple communications and propaganda, insurgents and their terrorist counterparts have moved to online recruitment, vetting of recruits, theological indoctrination, training, and logistical arrangements. Insurgents never have to meet an individual recruit until they feel comfortable; then they can use the Internet as a meeting site that they control. The wide availability of password-protected chat rooms allows insurgents to hold daily meetings with very little chance of discovery. Not only do Western intelligence agencies have to find the insurgents' chat room among the millions out there and crack the password, but they also must do so with a person who can speak the insurgents' language and who is convincing enough to keep the other chat participants from simply logging off. And, of course, insurgents can also move out of the larger chat room into private chat, which makes the infiltration problem even harder.

Another major change in insurgencies is that they are becoming self-supporting. Modern insurgents do conventional fund-raising, but they also run charity organizations, businesses, and criminal enterprises. In the past, most insurgencies depended on one or two major sponsors, which the United States could subject to diplomatic or economic pressure. Now, the insurgents' more varied money-raising schemes, combined with the ability to move funds outside official banking channels, make it increasingly difficult to attack insurgent finances.

Enduring Characteristics of Counterinsurgency

Just as insurgencies have enduring characteristics, so do counterinsurgencies. The fundamental weapon in counterinsurgency remains good governance. While the insurgent must simply continue to exist and conduct occasional attacks, the government must learn to govern effectively. The fact that there is an insurgency indicates the government has failed to govern. In short, the counterinsurgent is starting out in a deep hole.

The first governing step the counterinsurgent must take is to establish security for the people. Without effective, continuous security it does not matter if the people are sympathetic to the government—they must cooperate with the insurgent or be killed. Providing security is not enough, however. The government must also give the people hope for a better future—for their children if not for themselves. Furthermore, this better future must accord with what the people want, not what the counterinsurgent wants. The strategic hamlets campaign in Vietnam and the ideological emphasis on freedom in Iraq are examples of futures the counterinsurgent thought were best, but that didn't resonate with the population. In Vietnam, the peasants were intensely tied to their land; in Islamic culture, justice has a higher value than freedom.

The view of the future must address the "poverty of dignity" that Thomas L. Friedman has so clearly identified as a driving motivator for terrorists.[4] The people must have hope not just for a better life as they see it, but also for the feeling

of dignity that comes from having some say in their own futures.

There has been a great deal of discussion recently about whether the war in Iraq has progressed from terrorism to an insurgency and then to a civil war. While this is very important from the insurgent's point of view, it does not determine the first steps a counterinsurgent must take to win. As always, the first step is to provide security for the people. If the people stop supporting the government out of fear of insurgents, terrorists, or other violent groups, the government can only begin winning back its credibility by providing effective security. How that security is provided can vary depending on the threat, but the basic requirement is nonnegotiable. Thus, the fundamental concepts of counterinsurgency remain constant: provide security for the people and genuine hope for the future.

Emerging Characteristics of Counterinsurgency

The counterinsurgent must also come to grips with the emerging characteristics of insurgency. To deal with the networked, transnational character of insurgents, the counterinsurgent must develop a truly international approach to the security issues he faces. In addition, he must counter not just a single ideology, but all the ideologies of the various groups involved in the insurgency. This is daunting because attacking the ideology of one group might reinforce that of another. Successful ideological combat also requires the counterinsurgent to have deep cultural and historical knowledge of the people in the conflict. Success in this kind of fight will be difficult to achieve, but it can be attained if the government attacks the insurgents' coalition by exacerbating individual group differences.

Finally, the government must find a way to handle the numerous external actors who will come to join the insurgency. The true believers among them can only be killed or captured; the rest must be turned from insurgents to citizens. If possible, the counterinsurgent should keep foreign fighters from returning to their homes to spread the conflict there. Obviously, this will require a great deal of international cooperation. However, the nations involved should be anxious to cooperate to prevent these violent, potentially rebellious fighters from returning home.

Visualizing the Insurgency

With the mixture of enduring and emerging characteristics in insurgencies, the question arises as to how best to analyze the modern form. A clear understanding of the insurgency is obviously essential to the counterinsurgent. Unfortunately, recent history shows that conventional powers initially tend to misunderstand insurgencies much more often than they understand them. In Malaya, it took almost three years before the British developed a consistent approach to the Communist insurrection there. As John Nagl has noted, "Only about 1950 was the political nature of the war really grasped."[5] In Vietnam, it took until 1968 before General Creighton Abrams and Ambassador Robert Komer provided an effective plan to deal with the Viet Cong in the south. In Iraq, it took us almost two years to decide that we were dealing with an insurgency, and we are still arguing about its composition and goals.

To fight an insurgency effectively, we must first understand it. Given the complexity inherent in modern insurgency, the best visualization tool is a network map. The counterinsurgent must map the human networks involved on both sides because—

- A map of the human connections reflects how insurgencies really operate. A network map will reveal the scale and depth of interactions between different people and nodes and show the actual impact of our actions against those connections.
- A network map plotted over time can show how changes in the environment affect nodes and links in the network. Again, such knowledge is essential for understanding how our actions are hitting the insurgency.
- Models of human networks account for charisma, human will, and insights in ways a simple organizational chart cannot.
- Networks actively seek to grow. By studying

New Counterinsurgency Traits

- Develop an international approach
- Counter multiple ideologies
- Know the culture and its history
- Handle the outsiders

network maps, we can see where growth occurs and what it implies for the insurgent and the government. By studying which areas of the insurgent network are growing fastest, we can identify the most effective members of the insurgency and their most effective tactics, and act accordingly.

◆ Networks interact with other networks in complex ways that cannot be portrayed on an organizational chart.

◆ Network maps show connections from a local to a global scale and reveal when insurgents use modern technology to make the "long-distance" relationships more important and closer than local ones.

◆ Networks portray the transdimensional and transnational nature of insurgencies in ways no other model can. Networks can also reveal insurgent connections to the host-nation government, the civilian community, and any other players present in the struggle.

◆ Finally, if we begin to understand the underlying networks of insurgencies, we can analyze them using an emerging set of tools. In *Linked: The Science of Networks*, Albert-Laszlo Barabasi points to these new tools: "A string of recent breathtaking discoveries has forced us to acknowledge that amazingly simple and far reaching laws govern the structure and evolution of all the complex networks that surround us."[6]

We should also use network modeling when we consider our own organizations. Unlike the hierarchical layout we habitually use when portraying ourselves, a network schematic will allow us to see much more clearly how our personnel policies affect our own operations. When we chart an organization hierarchically, it appears that our personnel rotation policies have minimal effect on our organizations. One individual leaves, and another qualified individual immediately fills that line on the organization chart; there is no visual indication of the impact on our organization. If, however, we plotted our own organizations as networks, we could see the massive damage our personnel rotation policies cause. When a person arrives in country and takes a job, for some time he probably knows only the person he is working for and a few people in his office. In a network, he will show up as a small node with few connections. As time passes, he makes new connections and finds old friends in other jobs throughout the theater. On a network map, we will see him growing from a tiny node to a major hub. Over the course of time, we will see his connections to other military organizations, to U.S. and allied government agencies, host-nation agencies, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and so forth. Just as clearly, when he rotates, we will see that large hub instantaneously replaced by a small node with few connections. We will be even more alarmed to see the massive impact the simultaneous departure of numerous hubs has on the functionality of our network.

To assist us in building our network maps, we can use any of a number of sophisticated antigang software programs that allow us to track individuals and visualize their contacts. Essentially sophisticated versions of the old personalities-organizations-incidents databases, these programs allow us to tie together the intelligence reports we get to build a visual picture of the connections revealed. For instance, we pick up a suspect near a bombing site, check him against the database, and find that although he has not been arrested before, he is closely related to a man we know to be involved in a political party. We can then look at other members of the family and party to see if there are other connections to the incident, to the person we arrested, or to the organization possibly involved.

Good software will allow for instant visualization of these relationships in a color-coded network we can project on a wall, print out, or transmit to other analysts. Good software almost instantly accomplishes the hundreds of hours of scut work that used to be required to tie isolated,

apparently unrelated reports together. It allows us to look for third-and even fourth-level connections in a network and, thus, to build a much more useful network map. In particular, we will be able to see the gaps where we know there ought to be connections.

Ten years ago, software of this analytical quality was available and being used to track gang activity in the United States. I am uncertain of the status of current DOD human intelligence software, but I doubt it reaches down to the critical company and platoon levels of the counterinsurgency fight. We have to take aggressive action to get better software and make it work. If cities can give this kind of information to policemen on the streets, we owe it to our companies and platoons.

By mapping the human connections in insurgent networks and then applying cultural knowledge and network theory to the networks, we can understand them more clearly. We can also apply the common-sense observation that most networks grow from pre-existing social networks. In fact, such an approach has already been used. Marc Sageman has done a detailed study of al-Qaeda and its affiliated organizations, mapped the operational connections, and then compared them to pre-existing social connections.[7] His work points the way to much more effective analysis of insurgent and terrorist organizations.

Sageman's studies have revealed the key nodes and links in each of al-Qaeda's parts and how changes in the operating environment over time have affected those parts. Sageman has also identified both the real and virtual links between individuals and al-Qaeda's constituent organizations. Most important, however, the studies give us a starting point from which to examine any network: the preexisting social connections of a society. Rather than starting from scratch, we can analyze the limited intelligence we do obtain within the social and cultural context of the insurgency. In short, Sageman's approach allows us to paint a picture of the enemy network that we can analyze.

Security not Defensive

For the counterinsurgent, the central element in any strategy must be the people. The counterinsurgent has to provide effective government in order to win the loyalty of the people. This is easy to say, but helping another country establish good governance is one of the most challenging tasks possible. The conflict in Iraq highlights how difficult it is to help establish a government in a fractious society. Beyond the discussion of whether or not there is a civil war in Iraq, we can't even agree on whether a strategy that focuses on the people is inherently offensive or defensive. Obviously, if our approach is perceived to be a defensive one, most strategists will be reluctant to adopt it, simply because defense rarely wins wars.

In fact, in counterinsurgencies, providing security for the people is an inherently offensive action. No one questions that during conventional wars, attacks that seize enemy territory to deny the enemy resources, a tax base, and a recruiting base are considered offensive actions. But for some reason, when we conduct population control operations in counterinsurgency, they are considered defensive even though these operations have the same effect: they deny the insurgent the things he needs to operate.

A population control operation is the most offensive action one can take in a counterinsurgency. Just like in conventional war, once you have seized a portion of the enemy's territory, you cannot then evacuate it and give it back to him. If you do so, you simply restore all the resources to his control while eroding the morale of the government, the people, and your own forces.

In a counterinsurgency, big-unit sweeps and raids are inherently defensive operations. We are reacting to an enemy initiative that has given him control of a portion of the country. We move through, perhaps capture or kill some insurgents, and then move back to our defensive positions. In essence, we are ceding the key terrain—the population and its resources—to the insurgent. We might have inflicted a temporary tactical setback on our enemy, but at a much greater cost to our operational and strategic goals. The fact that we sweep and do not hold exposes the government's weakness to the people. It also exposes them to violence and does little to improve their long-term security or prospects for a better life.

Clearly, population control operations are the truly offensive operations in a counterinsurgency. Just as clearly, host-government and U.S. forces will rarely have sufficient troops to conduct such operations nationwide at the start of the counterinsurgent effort. Thus, we need to prioritize areas that will receive the resources to provide full-time, permanent security; population control, and reconstruction. The clear, hold, and build strategy is the correct one. However, it must recognize the limitations of government forces and, for a period, cede control of some elements of the population to the insurgent to provide real protection for the rest of the population. This is essentially the "white, grey, and black" approach used by the British in Malaya.[8] As Sir Robert Thompson has noted, "Because a government's resources, notably in trained manpower, are limited, the [counterinsurgent] plan must also lay down priorities both in the measures to be taken and in the areas to be dealt with first. If the insurgency is countrywide, it is impossible to tackle it offensively in every area. It must be accepted that in certain areas only a holding operation can be conducted."[9]

Further, by focusing our forces to create real security in some areas rather than the illusion of security across the country, we can commence rebuilding. The resulting combination of security and prosperity will contrast sharply with conditions in insurgent-controlled areas. When we have sufficient forces to move into those areas, the people might be more receptive to the government's presence.

Command and Control

There is an old saying in military planning: get the command and control relationships right, and everything else will take care of itself. It is a common-sense acknowledgment that people provide solutions only if they are well-led in a functional organization. Thus the first and often most difficult step in counterinsurgency is to integrate friendly force command and execution. Note that I say "integrate" and not "unify." Given the transnational, transdimensional nature of today's insurgencies, it will be impossible to develop true unity of command for all the organizations needed to fight an insurgency. Instead, we must strive for unity of effort by integrating the efforts of all concerned.

While the U.S. military does not like committees, a committee structure might be most effective for command in a counterinsurgency. There should be an executive committee for every major political subdivision, from city to province to national levels. Each committee must include all key personnel involved in the counterinsurgency effort—political leaders (prime minister, governors, and so on), police, intelligence officers, economic developers (to include NGOs), public services ministers, and the military. The political leaders must be in charge and have full authority to hire, fire, and evaluate other members of the committee. Committee members must not be controlled or evaluated by their parent agencies at the next higher level; otherwise, the committee will fail to achieve unity of effort. This step will require a massive cultural change to the normal stovepipes that handle all personnel and promotion issues for the government. One of the biggest hindrances to change is that many think the current hierarchical organization is effective. They think of themselves as "cylinders of excellence" rather than the balky, inefficient, and ineffective stovepipes they really are.

Above the national-level committee, which can be established fairly quickly under our current organization, we need a regional command arrangement. Given the transnational nature of modern insurgency, a single country team simply cannot deal with all the regional and international issues required in effective counterinsurgency. Thus we will have to develop a genuine regional team. The current DOD and Department of State organizations do not lend themselves well to such a structure and will require extensive realignment. This realignment must be accomplished.

Once the national and regional committees are established, Washington must give mission-type orders, allocate sufficient resources, and then let in-country and regional personnel run the campaign. Obviously, one of the biggest challenges in this arrangement is developing leaders to head the in-country and regional teams, particularly deployable U.S. civil leaders and host-nation

leaders. An even bigger challenge will be convincing U.S. national-level bureaucracies to stay out of day-to-day operations.

Once established, the committees can use the network map of the insurgency and its environment to develop a plan for victory. The network map provides important information about the nature of the interaction between the key hubs and smaller nodes of the insurgency. While the hubs and nodes are the most visible aspects of any network, it is the nature of the activity between them that is important. We must understand that well to understand how the network actually functions. This is difficult to do, and what makes it even more challenging is that one cannot understand the network except in its cultural context. Therefore, we must find and employ people with near-native language fluency and cultural knowledge to build and interpret our map.

Speed versus Accuracy

For counterinsurgencies, Colonel John Boyd's observation-orientation-decision-action (OODA) loop remains valid, but its focus changes.[10] In conventional war, and especially in the aerial combat that led Boyd to develop his concept, speed was crucial to completing the OODA loop—it got you inside your opponent's OODA loop. We have to use a different approach in counterinsurgency. Stressing speed above all else in the decision cycle simply does not make sense in a war that can last a decade or more.

In counterinsurgency, we still want to move speedily, but the focus must be more on accuracy (developed in the observation-orientation segment of the loop). The government must understand what it is seeing before it decides what to do. To date, network-centric concepts have focused on shortening the sensor-to-shooter step (Boyd's decision-action segment). Now, we must focus on improving the quality of the observe-orient segment. Even more important, the OODA loop expands to track not just our enemy's reaction, but how the entire environment is reacting—the people, the host-nation government, our allies, our forces, even our own population.

Attacking the Network

Because effective offensive operations in a counterinsurgency are based on protecting the people, direct action against insurgent fighters is secondary; nevertheless, such action remains a necessary part of the overall campaign plan. Once we understand the insurgent network or major segments of it, we can attack elements of it. We should only attack, however, if our attacks support our efforts to provide security for the people. If there is a strong likelihood of collateral damage, we should not attack because collateral damage, by definition, lessens the people's security. In addition, the fundamental rules for attacking a network are different from those used when attacking a more conventional enemy. First, in counterinsurgency it is better to exploit a known node than attack it. Second, if you have to attack, the best attack is a soft one designed to introduce distrust into the network. Third, if you must make a hard attack, conduct simultaneous attacks on related links, or else the attack will have little effect. Finally, after the attack, increase surveillance to see how the insurgency tries to communicate around or repair the damage. As they are reaching out to establish new contacts, the new nodes will be most visible.

Information Campaign

An integral part of counterinsurgency is an effective information campaign. It must have multiple targets (the host-country population, U.S. population, international community, insurgents and their supporters); it must be integrated into all aspects of the overall campaign; and it can only be effective if it is based on the truth—spin will eventually be discovered, and the government will be hard-pressed to recover its credibility.

Furthermore, our actions speak so loudly that they drown out our words. When we claim we stand for justice but then hold no senior personnel responsible for torture, we invalidate our message and alienate our audience. Fortunately, positive actions work, too. The tsunami and earthquake relief efforts in 2004 and 2005 had a huge effect on our target audiences. Conse-

quently, our information campaign must be based on getting information about our good actions out. Conversely, our actions must live up to our rhetoric.

To study a highly effective information campaign, I recommend looking at the one conducted by the Palestinians during Intifada. A detailed examination of how and why it was so successful can be found in *Intifada*, by Schiff and Ya'ari.[11]

Summary

Today's counterinsurgency warfare involves a competition between human networks—ours and theirs. To understand their networks, we must understand the networks' preexisting links and the cultural and historical context of the society. We also have to understand not just the insurgent's network, but those of the host-nation government, its people, our coalition partners, NGOs, and, of course, our own.

Counterinsurgency is completely different from insurgency. Rather than focusing on fighting, strategy must focus on establishing good governance by strengthening key friendly nodes while weakening the enemy's. In Iraq, we must get the mass of the population on our side. Good governance is founded on providing effective security for the people and giving them hope for their future; it is not based on killing insurgents and terrorists. To provide that security, we must be able to visualize the fight between and within the human networks involved. Only then can we develop and execute a plan to defeat the insurgents.

Notes

1. Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1990), 13.
2. Ian F. W. Beckett, ed., *Armed Force and Modern Counter-Insurgency: Armies and Guerrilla Warfare 1900-1945* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 8.
3. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1966), xi.
4. Thomas L. Friedman, "A Poverty of Dignity and a Wealth of Rage," New York Times, 15 July 2005.
5. John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 71.
6. Albert-Laszlo Barabasi, *Linked: The New Science of Networks* (Cambridge, Mass: Perseus Publishing, 2002). See also Lewis Sorley, *A Better War* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 2003).
7. Mark Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).
8. Used by the British in Malaya, the white-grey-black scheme is a corollary of the clear-hold-build strategy now in use in Iraq. White areas were those declared completely cleared of insurgents and ready for reconstruction and democratic initiatives. Grey areas were in dispute, with counterinsurgents and insurgents vying actively for the upper hand. Black areas were insurgent-controlled and mostly left alone pending the reallocation of government resources from other areas. See Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons of Vietnam and Malaya* (New York: Praeger, 1966), chap. 10.
9. Thompson, 55.
10. John Boyd articulated the OODA loop concept in a lengthy slide presentation. For a discussion of the OODA loop and other Boyd theories, see "Boyd and Military Strategy," <www.d-n-i.net/second_level/boyd_military.htm>, accessed 10 July 2006.
11. Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel's Third Front* (New York: Simon and Schuster, March 1990).

About the Author

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HOLT

Advances in Predeployment Culture Training: The U.S. Marine Corps Approach

by Barak A. Salmoni

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This article is dedicated to the memory of Captain Brian S. Letendre, USMC, and Lance Corporal Cory R. Guerin, USMC.

The history and self-identity of the United States Marine Corps are based on operations in foreign environments in close proximity to peoples from foreign cultures and with indigenous security personnel. Still, the systematic study of foreign cultures in an operationally focused fashion is a relatively new phenomenon for Marines.

Since late 2003, Marine units deploying to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have undergone orientation training on the culture of places to which they will deploy. A three-stage evolution has taken place in the conception and execution of such training.

At first, the moniker was "cultural sensitivity training." The goal of the training was to learn how to avoid offending indigenous people by focusing on decorum, taboos, "do's and don'ts," pleasantries, and the etiquette of face-to-face nonmilitary interactions. Some referred to this as "culturization." The training also included an introduction to the history of the operational areas. Marines returning from deployments later commented that social aspects of such training only partially reflected realities in what were diverse, changing areas of operations, while the coverage of history was too academic, with insufficient links to contemporary dynamics.

"Culture awareness classes," a term used into

2004, placed more emphasis on the *contemporary* history, political legacies, and visible religion of the OIF and OEF theaters. The training began to address evolving social dynamics, and it was based on the firsthand observations of deployed troops and the personnel teaching the classes. The training also paid more attention to culturally important tactics, techniques, and procedures, such as the use of translators. In this sense, culture trainers moved beyond a priori assumptions of what might be important to deploying troops, to a method of curriculum development that integrated soldiers' and Marines' recent experiences and articulated needs.

Into 2005, "tactical culture training" or "operational culture learning" replaced culture awareness classes. The focus shifted from not offending people (a *negative* incentive) to grasping local human dynamics in order to accomplish the mission (a *positive* incentive). Thus, culture *knowledge*—knowledge applied toward achieving mission goals—became an element of combat power and a force multiplier. Increasingly realistic culture dynamics were injected into field exercises, in particular the stability and support operations exercises coordinated by Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM).

The responsibility for finding qualified instructors and appropriate learning materials evolved in a similar fashion. In the 2003-2004 phases, battalion, regimental, and division commanders preparing for second deployments into theater recognized the need for culture and language education and attempted to identify the knowledge necessary and those who could teach it. Their conscientious but improvised efforts in a new field of predeployment military learning yielded uneven results across the deploying Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).

In late 2004, TECOM took over the responsibility for all aspects of predeployment training in the Corps. It too turned to culture training, coordinating and eventually encompassing efforts already in progress while continuing to consult with operating forces.

Along with removing the burden of developing and coordinating culture training from the operating forces, TECOM, via ongoing consultation with OIF and OEF veterans, initiated changes to help determine who was a subject-matter expert for warfighter culture training. Instead of generalist historians, religion specialists, and journalists, younger personnel who combined recent operational experience with academic study, site visits, and debriefing of returning units conducted the training. In this respect, cultural trainers have been working to shorten the lessons-learned feedback loop from deployment to deployment.

From Ad Hoc to Institutional and Operational

The culmination of the culture training process was the emergence in May 2005 of the Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL), established on the initiative of Lieutenant General James Mattis, the commanding general of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, and based on his experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq. The planning and initial stand-up of CAOCL occurred under the guidance of TECOM's commanding general at the time, Major General T. S. Jones.

Mattis and Jones were guided by the emphasis the Marine Corps Commandant, General Michael Hagee, put on invigorated training and education for global contingencies in an irregular warfare environment. Hagee's vision called for more and better training and education on foreign cultures, languages, and the regional and cultural contexts of counterinsurgency and irregular warfare.[1]

CAOCL immediately assumed the role of coordinating, sourcing, and planning operational culture predeployment training throughout the Marine Corps. By August 2005, CAOCL staff had visited the MEF area of responsibility (AOR) in al-Anbar province, Iraq, to evaluate previous culture training in order to develop new material for the upcoming training cycle. The staff emerged with standardized procedures for culture training assessment and sustainment teams that would go to other areas of operation. By partnering on these visits with instructors from Marine Corps

Professional Military Education (PME) schools and students in regional learning programs, CAOCL affirmed two central principles: first, to conduct effective culture training, culture trainers need to know and understand cultures in a military context by experiencing them first-hand; second, to effect change across the service, there must be a feedback loop from predeployment culture training to the schoolhouses.

Although CAOCL brought onto its staff Marines and civilians who had been involved in culture training since 2003, it suffered and continues to suffer from the need to quickly and continually expand its educational and training ambit in a time of war, as opposed to gradually and methodically building up in a time of peace. Nevertheless, the hectic operational tempo has helped CAOCL to better understand its mission and to evolve responsively and responsibly. Thus, even with a skeleton staff, by January 2006 its trainers had begun to service training requests in Hawaii and Okinawa, supporting I, II, and III MEF. This was in addition to providing predeployment classes and learning tools for culture and language to detachments deploying to OEF and areas of responsibility in the Caucasus and Africa.

CAOCL is chartered as the Marine Corps' operational culture and operational language center of excellence, with chief responsibility for the training and education continuum. The latter currently consists of three main waypoints:

◆ *Predeployment training at the small-unit to major-subordinate-command level.* This remains CAOCL's overarching, highest priority. Through small one-to-three-man teams, the center teaches Marines in classrooms, observes and evaluates field exercises, and provides scenario-development assistance to command post exercises, often through solicited "injects" to the efforts of already existing TECOM elements.

◆ *Integration of culture training into PME.* Commanders at all levels have articulated a concern that predeployment training, be it for culture or language, is in reality just-in-time, last-ditch training. TECOM leaders have thus made it a priority to ensure that PME at all appropriate levels integrates curricula on operational culture concepts and tools, aligned with the rank of PME students and the roles they are to take up after graduation. TECOM seeks to create a chain linking all phases in operational culture PME on both the officer and enlisted levels, and CAOCL has been charged with ensuring these linkages. To best do this, in summer 2006 CAOCL established a professorship of advanced operational culture at Marine Corps University, filled by a cultural anthropologist with significant fieldwork abroad.

◆ *Establishment of institutional culture and language programs.* A cardinal principle of the post-Cold War world of irregular warfare is uncertainty about the nature and location of military engagements. An effective military will feature operating forces seeded with personnel possessing a baseline capability to operate with culture and language knowledge in many environments and types of operations, from disaster relief through police actions and counterinsurgency up to high-intensity, force-on-force combat. To meet this challenge, the Marine Corps has begun to develop career-long regional culture and language learning opportunities to be offered via the Internet and at language learning resource centers at the major Marine bases across the globe. These opportunities will be directed at noncommissioned and commissioned officers in the career force and are intended to draw on the conceptual learning underway in the PME schools.

CAOCL is also tasked to liaise with the other services' emerging centers for culture education. It bears noting that the Army, in particular, has made fast strides of late in this direction, with the Navy and Air force in hot pursuit. Continuing collaboration and liaison will be important as each service seeks to ensure that its own needs are met. CAOCL has also pursued links and mutual learning opportunities with similar military centers among allies in Europe and the Middle East.

A Threefold Shift

The establishment of CAOCL marks a significant threefold shift. First, Marine Corps senior and field-grade leaders now understand that

operational culture and language are central to mission success, especially in the brave new world of irregular warfare and distributed operations. Second, learning from I MEF's and II MEF's past efforts, the Marine Corps has chartered CAOCL to take the burden off the operating forces in the culture-language realm while they (the forces) prepare for deployment. Battalion commanders, for example, will not have to make their best Rolodex-aided guess on whom to call for culture and language training. CAOCL staff will either provide the training or evaluate and recommend other providers. The key is that CAOCL will consult with the requesting unit to ensure defined needs are met.

Third, if we look at the body of literature about culture in warfighting, we see an evolution. In early 2004, writing focused on the same initial message, worthy of repetition: culture is important.[2] But from late 2004 on, writers attempted to define culture in a military context. The overall harvest has produced some intellectually abstract work ill-suited to warriors, along with approaches edging towards stereotypical conclusions.[3] On the other hand, authors closer to the warfighting community began to produce work with conceptual and informational utility for culturally educating Marines and soldiers preparing to deploy. Some of this was published.[4] Other materials were authored by service people looking after the needs of their units.[5]

As the proponent for service-level doctrine on operational culture in the training, educational, and operational domains, CAOCL aspires to carve out a niche focused on the operator. This focus is reflected in the emerging definition of operational culture CAOCL has provided for officer PME. The definition ignores factors that usually constitute generic definitions of "culture" and adds atypical factors from "operational culture." In this way, CAOCL seeks to ensure that training focuses on what can be broadly described as "the lived human dynamics that influence a particular military operation." There are three clusters of ideas to be defined: operational culture, operational culture learning, and culture operator.

◆ *Operational Culture.* Governed by a particular operation's goals, material assets, and functional areas of personnel, "operational culture" consists of—

▼ Operationally relevant behavior and expressed attitudes of groups within indigenous forces against or with whom Marines operate, civilians among whom Marines operate, and indigenous groups whom Marines wish to influence.

▼ Factors determining operationally relevant behavior and attitudes, to include biological, social, environmental, and individual.

▼ Historical mechanisms shaping the factors behind determinants of operationally relevant behavior and expressed attitudes.

▼ Knowledge in order to successfully plan and execute across the operational spectrum.

◆ *Operational Culture Learning.* In predeployment training scaled to rank and billet and focused on mission locality and objectives, "operational culture learning" includes—

▼ Study of a specific area of operation's (AO's) human environment and its shaping forces.

▼ Training in billet-focused language domains.

▼ Use of distance learning, face-to-face classes, and field exercises.

In PME phases geared to the responsibilities Marines will have to undertake at the completion of each level, the learning includes—

▼ Study of the concepts of operationally relevant culture.

▼ Development of skills necessary to succeed in diverse environments.

▼ Examination of human, print, and electronic resources for learning about operational culture.

▼ Exploration of the role of culture as suggested by past operations and simulations, along with discussion of the relevant skills needed for the deployment AO.

▼ Introduction to the application of skills to the current operating environment.

In the career continuum, appropriate to military occupational specialty (MOS), phase of career, and leadership responsibilities, learning includes—

▼ Service-, command-, and self-directed study of emergent operating environments.

▼ Maintenance of knowledge with respect to likely future areas of operation.

▼ Monitoring of service- and DOD-provided resources for culture learning.

▼ Fostering unit study of foreign cultures for operational benefit.

▼ Recording culture observations about deployment areas.

◆ *Culture Operator.* A "culture operator" works at the tactical, operational, and strategic level within his AO. He—

▼ Continually rereads the changing human terrain.

▼ Diagnoses the dynamic interaction among the conditions and parameters of human existence.

▼ Grasps the basic culture-influencing forces of the human environment.

▼ Considers the impact of Marine operations as a new condition and parameter of human existence.

▼ Influences local behaviors and attitudes.[6]

In such fashion, the Marine Corps is creating a training and educational program useful to deploying Marines at all levels. CAOCL's staff has found the above three categories useful as it continues to improve its approaches to structuring, executing, and evaluating operational culture learning.

Lessons Learned and Recommendations

The remainder of this article seeks to illuminate Marine Corps predeployment culture and language training lessons learned and suggest steps to the implementation of these lessons. Marine Corps lessons may be of benefit to sister services, each of which is now establishing centers for culture education and training.[7]

A seat at the table. Predeployment training and work-ups are planned, usually through a comprehensive process involving solicited opinions; interactions between units, higher commands, and training entities; and meetings of interested parties. This process enables the creation of a coherent overall training package.

The culture component must be included in this preplanning process. Doing so is difficult because the concept of robust, systematic culture training is new to military thinking, and the individuals responsible for providing it across all the services are also new and relatively unknown. However, when planning for predeployment culture training occurs late, as an add-on, it jeopardizes the training. Preplanning is necessary to provide the right training to the right audiences at the right intervals in the predeployment cycle. It is the first step to achieving integrated, holistic, and mission-relevant culture training.

Inclusion of culture training in the planning process should occur at the highest possible operating force level—in this case, the G-3 of the MEF. Although lower-level units do not like being told what to do by higher, particularly when it comes to training, command direction is necessary to ensure a properly sequenced, integrated approach to training. It will also prevent subordinate units from overtaxing their operations sections in planning and coordinating culture training. When the highest levels of command drive the overall planning process, including culture and language training, they can transfer that burden to CAOCL.

Timing it right. Training for different kinds of skills must be timed right: it has to be relevant to when Marines use those skills. This is particularly true in the realm of operational culture and language. If training on these two related topics comes too early or too late, many Marines will think it is irrelevant to the upcoming deployment, no matter what they are told to think by commanders who get up to lecture them. In addition, if it is done too early, Marines might lose some essential concrete skills—use of a translator, formulaic interaction, spatial dynamics, key phrases in the local language, culturally coded interaction with females, informational interviewing techniques, or de-escalation of tension techniques.

Conversely, cultural and language training too close to the deployment date runs the risk of finding Marines unavailable because of last-minute requirements. It is also too late then to include concepts for application in field exercises—they might appear to be added "bricks in the

pack." Most important, at this point, the unit already has a fully crystallized deployment mindset: some commanders inculcate a perspective in which the indigenous culture is a core consideration, while others might permit a solely kinetic inclination.

In-unit, leader-mentored study of service-level-approved materials must precede the main block of face-to-face culture training. The face-to-face classes should precede, by 10 days to two weeks, the major field exercises that come a few weeks before deployment to a Marine Air-Ground Task Force Training Center at 29 Palms, California.

Language training should phase in a month earlier, and in a fashion that does not separate Marines from units during the important predeployment phase. Using audio/video and printed pre-study tools at this point can help commanders and trainers identify the appropriate personnel for further face-to-face language training. Language training can continue afterwards, through use of learned phrases at Mojave Viper exercises and through web- and CD-based sustainment materials. Additionally, due to the relatively quick decay of survival-level language learning, language training cannot end earlier than two weeks prior to deployment.

Eluding the fire hose. A well-known method of training in the military is the "fire hose" method: spewing out immense amounts of information to huge, disparate groups in a short amount of time. It results from extremely tight training timelines and intense operational tempos. Such a pedagogical method is detrimental to learning "soft skills" with concrete ramifications.

A different scenario suggests the needed course of action. From January 2004 through July 2005, 1st Marine Division Schools ran Combined Action Program (CAP) training, inspired by positive Marine experiences in Vietnam. By the summer of 2004, when it was in full stride, small groups (either platoons or two platoons accompanied by the company commander) would undergo a multi-day package. Sometimes in-unit reading and discussion preceded the training.

The CAP culture class took up a nine-hour day—long enough to teach concepts, answer questions and discuss solutions, practice certain skills, and play hip-pocket tactical-decision games. Allowing enough time for several breaks and lunch permitted recovery as well as unstructured learning. CAP platoons took further learning materials away from the program, and they practiced skills at field exercises. It should be noted that over the past two years, CAP platoon commanders and Marines have continued to grow their culture and language skills during and between deployments, often acting as the larger company or battalion's point man on these matters.[8]

Although breaking MEFs into platoon-size elements for culture training is the most pedagogically sound method, it is likely unrealistic. CAOCL currently breaks a battalion-sized unit into three groups, to which it sends small training teams. Sergeants and below receive three and a half hours of face-to-face training. Staff sergeants through first lieutenants receive four and a half hours, and captains and higher receive a five-and-a-half-hour class. Commanders are encouraged to determine whether they require senior NCOs and warrant officers from the company and battalion staff to join the third group. The substance of each class must be aligned according to the planning and operating functions of the Marines in grouping the class. Trainers work to catalyze students' active engagement by responding to questions and employing hip-pocket tactical-decision games.

This only partly does away with fire hosing. Whatever the rank cutoffs, class size should not exceed two companies. To be fully effective, self- or commander-driven PME reading should precede classroom study. CAOCL then provides programs scaled to different ranks and functions. In the same spirit, the classroom only begins the learning process; it is followed by distance learning. CAOCL currently offers CD and web-based distance learning material consisting of audiovisual modules on human-terrain mapping, negotiations and meetings, the state of the Iraq insurgency, working with the Iraqi security forces, culture aspects of convoy operations, cultivating relationships with Iraqi officials, use of a translator, culture aspects of interacting with Iraqis in and around domiciles, and third-country/Arab journalist measures. This is in addition to basic

and basic-plus language support. Commanders who choose to prioritize this distance learning find that their units' performance in field exercises improves and that their Marines consider culture and language as integral to the overall tactical and operational fight.

Qualified instructors. Another issue having to do with culture training involves who is qualified to teach the operational culture of a particular AO. If the instructor is uniformed, he or she must be a soldier or Marine who has recently deployed operationally to the AO in a job requiring ongoing interaction with the indigenous population—the division combat operations center watch officer from OIF-I will not do. MOS is not important here; interaction with Iraqis on a regular basis is.

The Marine instructor must be temperamentally inclined to teach culture as an operational force multiplier and be able to combine experience-based knowledge with further learning and research. He or she must pursue, and be afforded the time and opportunity for, cross-pollination with Marines who have just returned from deployments. Fundamentally, the Marine instructor must be a good communicator.

One military community conspicuously unsuited to executing predeployment culture training is the chaplaincy corps. For several reasons, studying a religion to minister to a flock does not prepare one to teach about other cultures. First, the chaplain's primary mission is to provide religious, moral, and psychological support to warfighters. Anything diluting this would be an imprudent distraction. Second, chaplains may be inclined to perceive culture as being determined by an AO's religion. They may also focus on the textual as opposed to the lived dynamics of the religion in that area. In OIF and OEF, this is equally true of Christian and Muslim chaplains because very few of the latter come from the Middle East or Central Asia. Third, all humans are biased, but chaplains, given their calling to minister for one particular religion, are more so. Additionally, because of their rank—03 through 06—they have extra moral weight, so that if they allow religious bias into teaching, it would more likely be taken as truth.

If the teacher is a civilian, matters are more delicate and criteria more subjective. The Marine Corps must seek out and benefit from the civilian Defense Department, academic, and general community; it cannot deny deploying Marines the benefits of such expertise. Civilians without prior service must have lived in the AO in question or in a similar adjoining country. It is preferred that they possess advanced academic training so they can speak at a level of expertise beyond the anecdotal or journalistic.[9] This assumes they will also possess language skills for the AO, if only as a matter of credibility. They must also be familiar with the military, with the Marine Corps, and with the nature of the unit they are talking to, and they should have enough of a grasp of the mission to be instructionally useful to the Marines.

In fact, civilian authorities, especially academicians, must be positively inclined to the Corps and the mission. Fundamentally, they must know how to talk to Marines at various levels and be open to learning from Marines about the Corps, its culture, and their experiences. It is also important that they be able to teach: good analysts are not always good teachers; briefing is not teaching; and a good performance is not always the same as good teaching.

One final point: due to the global nature of Marine Corps deployments and the constantly evolving Marine demographic, deploying units or their neighbors will frequently have in their ranks Marines native to the upcoming deployment AO. Units and outside trainers must locate these Marines and use them to provide educational and operational value-added to personnel going forward.

Making communicators. Operating forces need language capabilities corresponding to actual functions, just as they need orientation to the dialect used in the actual AO. Marines and Marine units also require pedagogical methodologies that resonate with them.

Thus far, commanders have called upon various language learning resources, with mixed results. The Defense Language Institute (DLI) is rightfully promoted as the one-stop shop for language. Government-sponsored or commercial contracting organizations have presented quick fixes ranging from pointy-talky cards to machines

that translate as you go (phraselators). At times, MEF- or division-level training officers have worked with local community colleges to develop survival-level language courses. All of these resources have been helpful and have provided lessons for improvement. But they come with drawbacks:

- They all cost money.
- Different foci and impetuses have influenced quality. For example, contracting organizations are primarily interested in profit, not necessarily in what might work best for Marines on the ground. Government-sponsored think tanks, another source of possible solutions, tend to favor a technology-heavy approach to something that, by its very nature, cannot be solved solely by technology.
- DLI's primary mission has been to train cryptographic linguists and foreign area officers in 40- to 63-week courses. There has been less historical emphasis on the short-term preparation of operational units in the basic terms, phrases, and learning skills needed for specific AOs and functions. DLI has made strides in this direction, but the operating forces and services must still aid, guide, and craft the materials DLI produces, as well as supplement the classes they provide, so that DLI can continue its traditional role of preparing language professionals.
- Survival or familiarization language programs have had mixed success in filling the needs articulated by training officers, units, and returning Marines. "Market research" in the form of pre-program planning with receiving units, in-country site visits, no-holds-barred debriefing of returning units, and inclusion of returning Marines in subsequent planning sessions has often been one task too many for ad hoc programs whose personnel are scrambling to deliver training on very short timelines. Survival-level courses provided at community colleges close to Marine Corps bases have been a good alternative to unit-fabricated training. Proximity to the units has facilitated a feedback-to-teaching loop that has facilitated effective instruction. The survival-level courses at Coastal Carolina Community College, for example, have greatly improved thanks to Marine input.

To ensure Marines get the best possible predeployment language training, units and returning Marines must participate in the program planning stage to define skill sets for operating levels from fire teams to field-grade officers. This planning must also address what kind of pedagogical products will actually work in the Marine classroom and what kinds of operational language tools will work in the field. Unit representatives, higher-level developers of the overall predeployment training timeline, and service-level coordinators of language training must all meet to determine the timing and sequencing of language exposure as well as the mix of classroom and distance learning.

In executing language training, it is necessary though not sufficient that teachers be native or near-native speakers of the language. They must also understand Marine learning styles and the Marine mission in an area. Fundamentally, they must be teachers by profession and training, not by accident of native speaking skills. Like those who teach culture, ideally they should also have had operational experience with Marine or Army units in the field. Furthermore, to the extent possible, language-capable Marines, even if their skill levels are rudimentary, must be included in the training as instructors' assistants.

Audiences. Because Afghanistan and Iraq are so culturally foreign, everyone wants predeployment cultural orientation. The senior commander's intent has often been that every sailor and Marine receives it. This approach indicates the seriousness with which the Marine Corps now approaches the issue, but it is not certain that training "every sailor and Marine" is the most prudent course of action.

Any sailor or Marine who has to go outside the wire to interact with indigenous people should, when it is plausible, participate in distance learning and face-to-face training. The intensity and detail of the training should be the greatest for infantry units, civil affairs groups, military police units, military/police adviser teams, and air-naval gunfire liaison elements. Intensity and detail also need to be substantial for commanders and staffs at the regimental through MEF levels (although the issues and skills covered will differ).

Certain support units have a high likelihood of performing infantry-like roles or interacting with indigenous people. These include motor transport, combat engineers, engineer service battalions, medical personnel, and those components of the MEF logistics group who liaise with third-country contractors, laborers, and government officials. Intelligence assets external to infantry units, logistics units, and the wing also need specific culture training (although it should be provided by the intelligence community). For all of these units, culture awareness and culture skills are necessary in the planning and operating continuum.

There are, however, a large number of Marines and sailors who will never go outside the wire (or off the vessel): those who have no operational planning role, and those in the more technical fields where interaction with indigenous people will be limited. Aircraft mechanics, bulk fuel specialists, nuclear-biological-chemical specialists, aircraft ergonomics and aviator human stress specialists—these Marines will not interact meaningfully with indigenous people; such being the case, using limited culture training assets and time to deliver classes may ill-serve a laudable intent.

Thus, an integral part of culture training prior to planning must involve determining which personnel should get what kind of exposure to operational culture and what the mix of distance learning and face-to-face training should be for each audience. In this way, the commander's intent will indeed be served through economies of force benefiting both the training cadre and the personnel receiving the training. This method will have the added benefit of ensuring from the outset that the predeployment certification requirements of all echelons are met.

Current Status of Training

Predeployment operational culture and language training now unfolds in the following fashion: as soon as higher headquarters and TECOM begin to plan for predeployment training, those providing the culture components through distance learning, classroom interaction, and tactical exercises provide input, ensuring that the culture piece is timed right and sequenced appropriately.

Then, as units are pegged on the deployment schedule and assigned dates for classroom teaching and field exercises, CAOCL representatives brief battalion-level operations officers to plan the distance learning phase that will precede and follow the face-to-face interactions. During this time, CAOCL conducts in-theater site visits to develop timely, relevant learning categories and materials based on critical reviews of past practices.

Face-to-face interactions in the predeployment phase follow up on and synchronize with distance learning. Rather than one-day, multi-hour fire-hose sessions, CAOCL mobile training teams engage in more, but shorter and less intrusive, teaching visits to units, making course corrections as leader evaluations of classes and unit performance require. Classes are followed by experiential culture learning at field exercises monitored and reported on by culture trainers. Instructional after-action reports, focusing on the performance of Marines and other exercise forces, are distributed to unit leaders and exercise controllers.

Immediately prior to deployment, leaders from platoon commanders on up receive the results of a CAOCL visit to the AO. The purpose of the visit is to cover evolving trends and access information that redeploying units might not transmit in the relief-in-place (RIP) process. Thus, through leaders' seminars or reports, the training cadre ensures that culture coordination occurs as part of the RIP. Finally, CAOCL personnel visit the theater to observe and interview Marines at mid-deployment to glean critical input about the efficacy of previous training. With this information, they then begin the education and training cycle for the next units.

Into the Future

As Marines and soldiers experience multiple tours in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other AOs, their insights about how to best conduct culture training matures. Based on participant observation and debrief of returning personnel, CAOCL thus works to evolve in response to articulated needs.

The Marine Corps will therefore embrace new training initiatives in the coming months. First, Language Learning Resource Centers at Marine bases will provide ongoing language training in Iraqi Arabic, Dari, and Pashto, in addition to supplemental languages for the Pacific Command region. This means that predeployment language learning will be continuous, beginning much earlier than before. Distance learning will therefore provide a basis of capability upon which more targeted face-to-face instruction will build.

Second, inspired by successes the U.S. Army TRADOC Culture Center has had with "train-the-trainer" methods, CAOCL will transition in this direction. CAOCL is now developing week-long curriculum packages to be executed at regiments. These will target senior NCOs and company-grade officers who have had previous tours involving substantial interaction with indigenous people. By combining Marines' experiential knowledge with added instruction and training resources provided through TECOM, CAOCL will ensure units at the battalion and company level have organic training expertise available on demand, thus sustaining the credibility, responsiveness, and building-block nature of operational culture training. In effect, CAOCL instructors will assume the role of deep-fight resources, although they will continue to provide mobile training teams for more targeted, advanced-level seminars and exercise evaluation.

Conclusion

By establishing CAOCL, the Marine Corps articulated a vision of the human dynamics of indigenous peoples—culture—as a central planning and operating consideration for the present and future. This vision obliges CAOCL to provide culture learning worthy of the Marines whom the center serves. Through planning, program development, and consultation with sister services and foreign allies, TECOM has begun to implement a long-range vision encompassing Marine culture education at all levels and throughout the career continuum. Likewise, there is talk of a joint-level coordinating body or executive agent. However, before we contemplate any such initiatives, it would be prudent to continue to improve and sustain the predeployment training and education of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines going forward into the close fight.

Notes

1. See General M.W. Hagee, Commandant of the Marine Corps, "33rd Commandant of the Marine Corps Updated Guidance (The 21st-Century Marine Corps—Creating Stability in an Unstable World)," ALMAR 018/05, 18 April 2005 <http://www.usmc.mil/almars/almar2000.nsf/ 52f4f5d11f10b4c4852569b8006a3e35/35a74723d7bcc61085256fe70061040a?OpenDocument>.
2. See Major Chris Varhola, "American Challenges in Post-Conflict Iraq," *Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes*, 27 May 2004 <www.fpri.org/enotes/ 2004 0527.americawar. varhola.iraqchallenges.html>; George W. Smith Jr., "Avoiding a Napoleonic Ulcer: Bridging the Gap of Cultural Intelligence (Or, Have We Focused on the Wrong Transformation?)," *Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition: Essays 2004* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2004), 21-38; Montgomery McFate, "The Military Utility of Understanding Adversary Culture," *Joint Force Quarterly* 38 (2005); Barak Salmoni "Beyond Hearts and Minds: Culture Matters," Proceedings of the Naval Institute Press, November 2004; Alex Davis and Dan Fu, "Culture Matters: Better Decision Making Through Increased Awareness," *Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference* (I/ITSEC) 2004: <www.stottlerhenke.com /papers/IITSEC-04-culture.pdf>.
3. See Davis and Fu; Celestine Ntuen, "Culture-Centric Models for Military Simulation and Training," The 7th Annual Symposium on Human Interaction with Complex Systems 2005, 18 November 2005. Regarding potential stereotype formation, see Helen Altman Klein, Anna Pongonis, and Gary Klein, "Cultural Barriers to Multinational C2 Decision Making," Research Paper prepared through the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Contract No:DaaH01-00-C-R094:<www.au.af.mil /au/awc/awcgate/ccrp/2000ccrts_ klein_culture.pdf>.
4. Maxie McFarland, "Military Cultural Education," *Military Review* (March-April 2005); Philip C. Skuta, "Cross Cultural Savvy," U.S. Army War College Strategic Leadership Program, December 2005; P. M. Zeman, "Goat-Grab Diplomacy in Iraq," *Naval Institute Proceedings* (November 2005).
5. A growing number of company-grade soldiers and Marines have fulfilled this role within units. For examples, see John Koopman, "Marines Seal Bonds of trust: Special Unit Wants to Win Hearts and Minds," San